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Abstract. The Bitcoin backbone protocol [Eurocrypt 2015] extracts ba-
sic properties of Bitcoin's underlying blockchain data structure, such as
common preﬁx and chain quality, and shows how fundamental ap-
plications including consensus and a robust public transaction ledger
can be built on top of them. The underlying assumptions are proofs
of work (POWs), adversarial hashing power strictly less than 1/2 and
no adversarial pre-computationor, alternatively, the existence of an
unpredictable genesis block.
In this paper we ﬁrst show how to remove the latter assumption, present-
ing a bootstrapped Bitcoin-like blockchain protocol relying on POWs
that builds genesis blocks from scratch in the presence of adversarial
pre-computation. Importantly, the round complexity of the genesis block
generation process is independent of the number of participants.
Next, we consider applications of our construction, including a PKI gen-
eration protocol and a consensus protocol without trusted setup assum-
ing an honest majority (in terms of computational power). Previous
results in the same setting (unauthenticated parties, no trusted setup,
POWs) required a round complexity linear in the number of participants.
1 Introduction
As the ﬁrst decentralized cryptocurrency, Bitcoin [33] has ignited much excit-
ment, not only for its novel realization of a central bank-free ﬁnancial instrument,
but also as an alternative approach to classical distributed computing problems,
such as reaching agreement distributedly in the presence of misbehaving parties.
Formally capturing such reach has been the intent of several recent works, no-
tably [21], where the core of the Bitcoin protocol, called the Bitcoin backbone,
is extracted and analyzed. The analysis includes the formulation of fundamental
properties of its underlying blockchain data structure, which parties (miners)
? Research partly supported by ERC project CODAMODA, No. 259152, and Horizon
2020 project PANORAMIX, No. 653497.
maintain and try to extend by generating proofs of work (POW, aka cryp-
tographic puzzle [16,37,3,24])4, called common preﬁx and chain quality. It is
then shown in [21] how applications such as consensus (aka Byzantine agree-
ment) [36,31] and a robust public transaction ledger (i.e., Bitcoin) can be built
on top of such properties, assuming that the hashing power of an adversary
controlling a fraction of the parties is strictly less than 1/2.
Importantly, those properties hold assuming that all partieshonest and
adversarialwake up and start computing at the same time, or, alternatively,
that they compute on a common random string only made available at the
exact time when the protocol execution is to begin (see further discussion under
related work below). Indeed, the coinbase parameter in Bitcoin's genesis block,
hardcoded into the software, contains text from The Times 03/Jan/2009 issue [5],
arguably unpredictable.
While satisfactory in some cases, such a trusted setup/behavioral assumption
might be unrealistic in other POW-based systems where details may have been
released a lot earlier than the actual time when the system starts to run. A
case in point is Ethereum, which was discussed for over a year before the system
oﬃcially kicked oﬀ. That's from a practical point of view. At a foundational level,
one would in addition like to understand what kind of cryptographic primitives
can be realized without any trusted setup assumption and based on POWs, and
whether that is in particular the case for the Bitcoin backbone functionality and
its enabling properties mentioned above.
The former question was recently considered by Andrychowicz and Dziem-
bowski [1], who, building on previous suggestions by Aspnes et al. [2] of using
POWs as an identity-assignment tool and constructions by Fitzi et al. [19,12]
showing how to morph graded consistency into global consistency, showed
how to create a consistent PKI using POWs and no other trusted setup, which
can then be used to run secure computation protocols (e.g., [38,23]) and real-
ize any cryptographic functionality assuming an honest majority among parties.
While this in principle addresses the foundational concerns, it leaves open the
questions of doing it in scalable wayi.e., with round complexity independent of
the number of parties, and in the context of blockchain protocols in particular,
designing one that is provably secure without a trusted setup.
Our contributions. In this paper we answer the above questions. First, we
present a Bitcoin-like protocol that neither assumes a simultaneous start nor
the existence of an unpredictable genesis block, and has round complexity es-
sentially independent of the number of participants5. Eﬀectively, the protocol,
starting from scratch, enables the coexistence of multiple genesis blocks with
blockchains stemming from them, eventually enabling the players to converge to
4 In Bitcoin, solving a proof of work essentially amounts to brute-forcing a hash in-
equality based on SHA-256.
5 Essentially because even though there will be a dependency of the round complexity
of the setup phase on the probability of computing POWs, which in turn depends
on the number of parties, this dependency can be made small enough so as to be
considered a constant. See Remark 3.
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a single blockchain. This takes place despite the adversary being allowed (poly-
nomial in the security parameter) pre-computation time. We work in the same
model as [21] and we assume a 1/2 bound on adversarial hashing power. We call
this protocol the bootstrapped (Bitcoin) backbone protocol. A pictorial overview
of the protocol's phases, preceded by a period of potential precomputation by
the corrupt players, is given in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Timeline and phases of the bootstrapped Bitcoin backbone protocol.
Second, we present applications of our bootstrapped construction, starting
with its original one: a distributed ledger, i.e., a public and permanent sum-
mary of all transactions that honest parties can agree on as well as add their
own, despite the potentially disruptive behavior of parties harnessing less than
1/2 of the hashing power. This entails proving that the ledger's required secu-
rity properties (Persistence and Liveness  cf. [21]) hold in a genesis block-less
setting.
Next, we consider the problem of setting up a PKI in our unauthenticated
network setting from scratch. As mentioned above, the idea of using POWs as
an identity-assignment tool was put forth by Aspnes et al. [2]. Here we build
on this idea as well as on the 2-for-1 POWs technique from [21] to use our
bootstrapped protocol to assign identities to parties. The assignment relation
will possibly assign more than one identity to the same party, while guarantee-
ing that the majority of them is assigned to honest parties. Such an identity
infrastructure/pseudonymous PKI has numerous applications, including the
bootstrapping of a proof-of-stake protocol [28,30], and the election of honest-
majority subcommittees, which would enable the application of traditional
Byzantine fault-tolerant techniques for ledger creation and maintenance (cf. [7])
to permissionless (as opposed to permissioned) networks.
Finally, applying the 2-for-1 POWs technique we can also solve the consensus
(aka Byzantine agreement) problem [36,31] probabilistically and from scratch,
even if the adversary has almost the same hashing power as the honest parties6,
and with round complexity independent of the number of parties. Indeed, all
our protocols have round complexity linear in the security parameter, and enjoy
simultaneous termination. We conclude with an additional modiﬁcation to the
protocol that reduces (by a factor of n) the protocol's communication costs.
Related work. Nakamoto [32] proposed Bitcoin, the ﬁrst decentralized cur-
rency system based on POWs while relaxing the anonymity property of a digital
6 Thus marking a contrast with the 2
3
lower bound for consensus on the number of
honest parties in the traditional network setting with no setup [6].
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currency to mere pseudonymity. This work was followed by a multitude of other
related proposals including Litecoin, Primecoin [29], and Zerocash [4], and fur-
ther analysis improvements (e.g., [18,17]), to mention a few.
As mentioned above, we work in a model that generalizes the model put
forth by Garay et al. [21], who abstracted out and formalized the core of the
Bitcoin protocolthe Bitcoin backbone. As presented in [21], however, the pro-
tocol considers as valid any chain that extends the empty chain, which is not
going to work in our model. Indeed, if the adversary is allowed polynomial-time
pre-computation, he can prepare a very long, private chain; then, by revealing
blocks of this chain at the rate that honest players compute new blocks, he can
break security. As also mentioned above, to overcome this problem one can as-
sume that at the time honest parties start the computation, they have access to
a fresh common random string (a genesis block). Then, if we consider as valid
only the chains that extend this block, all results proved in [21] follow, since
the probability that the adversary can use blocks mined before honest players
woke up is negligible in the security parameter. In this paper we show how
to establish such genesis block directly, and in a number of rounds essentially
independent of the number of participants.
To our knowledge, the idea of using POWs to distributedly agree on some-
thing (speciﬁcally, a PKI) in an unauthenticated setting with no trusted setup
was ﬁrst put forth by Aspnes et al. [2], who suggested to use them as an identity-
assignment tool as a way to combat Sybil attacks [14], and in such a way that
the number of identities assigned to the honest and adversarial parties can be
made proportional to their aggregate computational power, respectively. For ex-
ample, by assuming that the adversary's computational power is less than 50%,
one of the algorithms in [2] results in a number of adversarial identities less
than half of that obtained by the honest parties. By running this procedure in
a pre-processing stage, it is then suggested in [2] that a standard authenticated
broadcast protocol (speciﬁcally, the one by Dolev and Strong [13]) could be run.
Such protocols, however, would require that the PKI be consistent, details of
which are not laid out in [2].
They are in [1], where Andrychowicz and Dziembowski address the more
general goal of secure computation in this setting based on POWs, as mentioned
earlier; the POWs are used to build a graded PKI, where keys have ranks.
The graded PKI is an instance of a graded agreement, or partial consistency
problem [19,12,20], where honest parties do not disagree by much, according
to some metric. In [19], Fitzi calls this the b-set-neighboring problem (proxcast
in [12]), with b the number of possible grades, and shows how to achieve global
consistency by running the b-set-neighboring protocol multiple times. In [1], the
fact is used that an unreliable broadcast is available among honest parties to
achieve the sameglobal consistency on a PKI, where the number of identities
each party gets is proportional to its hashing power, as suggested in [2].
The protocol in [1], however, suﬀers from a total running time that depends
on the number of parties, because of two factors: (1) the way in which it uses
POWs, and (2) the use of the Dolev-Strong authenticated broadcast protocol
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(run multiple times in parallel based on the graded PKI), which takes a linear
number of rounds. Regarding (1), and in more detail, in order to assign exactly
one key per party, a low variance POW scheme is used. This implies that the
time needed by an honest party to mine a POW is going to be proportional to
the ratio of the adversarial hashing power to the hashing power of the weakest
honest party. Otherwise, the rushing adversary would be able to compute more
identities in the additional time she has due to the latency of the communication
infrastructure.7 Regarding (2), we note that potentially an expected-constant-
round protocol could be used instead of Dolev-Strong, although the parallel
composition of n instances would require more involved techniques [11].
Furthermore, having a PKI allows parties to generate an unpredictable bea-
con (in the random oracle model), which is then suggested in [1] as a genesis
block-generation method for a new cryptocurrency. Yet, no formal treatment of
the security of the resulting blockchain protocol is presented, andas already
mentionedthe round complexity of the suggested genesis block generation pro-
cedure is linear in the number of participants, both in contrast to our work.
As in [1], Katz et al. [26] also consider achieving pseudonymous broadcast
and secure computation from POWs (cryptographic puzzles) and the existence
of digital signatures without prior PKI setup, but under the assumption of an
existing unpredictable beacon. Finally, Pass et al. [35] consider a partially syn-
chronous model of communication where parties are not guaranteed to receive
messages at the end of each round but rather after a speciﬁed delay ∆ (cf. [15]),
and show that the backbone protocol can be proven secure in this setting. In
principle, our results about the bootstrapped backbone protocol can be extended
to their setting as shown in [22].
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we describe the network and adversarial model, introduce some basic
blockchain notation, and enumerate the various security properties. In Section 3
we present the bootstrapped Bitcoin backbone protocol and its analysis. Appli-
cations are presented in Section 4: a robust public transaction ledger, and PKI
generation and consensus without trusted setup and with round complexity in-
dependent of the number of parties. Due to space limitations, some of the proofs
and further details are presented in the full version of the paper.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
We describe our protocols in a model that extends the synchronous communi-
cation network model presented in [21] for the analysis of the Bitcoin backbone
protocol (which in turn is based on Canetti's formulation of real world ex-
ecution for multi-party cryptographic protocols [8,9]). As in [21], the protocol
7 On the ﬂip side, the beneﬁt of the approach in [1] is that when all honest parties
have the same hashing power, a PKI that maps each party to exactly one identity
and preserves an honest majority on the keys can be achieved. However, in today's
environments where even small devices (e.g., mobile phones, smart watches) have
powerful CPUs with diﬀerent clock frequencies, this assumption is arguably weak.
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execution proceeds in rounds with inputs provided by an environment program
denoted by Z to parties that execute the protocol.
Next we provide a high level overview of the model, focusing on the diﬀer-
ences that are intrinsic to our setting where the adversary has a precomputation
advantage. The adversarial model in the network is actively malicious following
the standard cryptographic approach. The adversary is rushing, meaning that
in any given round it gets to see all honest players's messages before deciding
its strategy. Message delivery is provided by a diﬀusion mechanism that is
guaranteed to deliver all messages, without however preserving their order and
allowing the adversary to arbitrarily inject its own messages. Importantly, the
honest parties are not guaranteed to have the same view of the messages deliv-
ered in each round, except for the fact that all honest messages from the previous
round are delivered. Furthermore, the adversary is allowed to change the source
information on every message (i.e., communication is not authenticated). In the
protocol description, we will use Diffuse as the message transmission command
to capture the send-to-all functionality that is available in our setting.8 Note
that, as in [21], an adversarial sender may abuseDiffuse and attempt to confuse
honest parties by sending and delivering inconsistent messages to them.
In contrast to [21], where all parties (the honest ones and the ones controlled
by the adversary), are activated for the ﬁrst time in the execution of the protocol
in the same round9, in our model the environment will choose the round at
which all the honest parties will become active; the corrupted parties, on the
other hand, are activated in the ﬁrst round. Once honest parties become active
they will remain active until the end of the execution. In each round, after the
honest parties become active, the environment activates each one by providing
input to the party and receives the party's output when it terminates. When
activated, parties are able to read their input tape Input() and communication
tape Receive(), perform some computation that will be suitably restricted (see
below) and issue a Diffuse message that is guaranteed to be delivered to all
parties at the beginning of the next round.
In more detail, we model the execution in the following manner. We employ
the parameterized system of ITM's from [9] (2013 version) that is comprised of an
initial ITM Z, called the environment, and C, a control function that is speciﬁed
below. We remark that our control function C is suitably restricted compared
to that of [9,10] to take into account restrictions in the order of execution that
are relevant to our setting.
The execution is deﬁned with respect to a protocol Π, a set of parties
P1, . . . , Pn and an adversary A. The adversary is allowed to corrupt parties
adaptively up to a number of t < n. The protocol Π has access to two resources
or ideal functionalities, the random oracle, and the diﬀusion channel. Initially,
the environment may pass input to either the adversary A or spawn an instance
8 In [21] the command name Broadcast is used for this functionality, which we
sometimes also will use informally.
9 After their ﬁrst-time activation, the environment keeps activating parties in every
round (cf. [8]).
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running the protocol Π which will be restricted to be assigned to the lexico-
graphically smallest honest party (such restrictions are imposed by the control
function [9]). After a party Pi is activated, the environment is restricted to ac-
tivate the lexicographically next honest party, except in the case when no such
party is left, in which case the next program to be activated is the adversary A;
subsequently, the round-robin execution order between the honest parties will
be repeated.
Whenever a party is activated the control function allows for q queries to be
made to the random oracle while in the case of an activation of A a number of
t·q queries are allowed where t is the number of corrupted parties. Honest parties
are also allowed to annotate their queries to the random oracle for veriﬁcation
purposes, in which case an unlimited amount of queries is permitted (that still
counts towards the overall running time of the system execution). Note that the
adversary is not permitted to take advantage of this feature of the execution.
With foresight, this asymmetry will be necessary, since otherwise it would be
trivial for the adversary to break the properties of our protocols by simply jam-
ming the incoming communication tape of the honest parties with messages
whose veriﬁcation would deplete their access quota to the random oracle per
activation. Furthermore, for each party a single invocation to the diﬀusion chan-
nel is permitted. The diﬀusion channel maintains the list of messages diﬀused
by each party, and permits the adversary A to perform a fetch operation so
that it obtains the messages that were sent. When the adversary A is activated,
the adversary will interact with the diﬀusion channel, preparing the messages
to be delivered to the parties and performing a fetch operation. This write and
fetch mode of operation with the communication channel enables the channel to
enforce synchrony among the parties running the protocol (cf. [25]).
The term {viewPΠ,A,Z(κ, z)}κ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ denotes the random variable en-
semble describing the view of party P after the completion of an execution
with environment Z, running protocol Π, and adversary A, on auxiliary input
z ∈ {0, 1}∗. We often drop the parameters κ and z and simply refer to the en-
semble by viewPΠ,A,Z if the meaning is clear from the context. Following the
resource-bounded computation model of [9], it holds that the total length of the
execution is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter κ and the length
of the auxiliary string |z|, provided that the environment is locally bounded by a
polynomial (cf. Proposition 3 in [9]). Note that the above execution model cap-
tures adversarial precomputation since it permits the environment to activate
the adversary an arbitrary number of times (bounded by a polynomial in the
security parameter κ of course) before the round-robin execution of the honest
parties commences.
We note that the above modeling obviates the need for a strict upper bound
on the number of messages that may be transmitted by the adversary in each
activation (as imposed by [1]). In our setting, honest parties, at the discretion
of the environment, will be given suﬃcient time to process all the messages
delivered via the diﬀusion channel including all messages that are injected by
the adversary.
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The concatenation of the view of all parties ever activated in the execution,
say, P1, . . . , Pn, is denoted by viewΠ,A,Z . As in [21], we are interested in proto-
cols Π that do not make explicit use of the number of parties n or their identities.
Further, note that because of the unauthenticated nature of the communication
model the parties may never be certain about the number of participants in a
protocol execution.
In our correctness and security statements we will be concerned with proper-
ties of protocols Π running in the above setting (as opposed to simulation-based
notions of security). Such properties will be deﬁned as predicates over the random
variable viewΠ,A,Z(κ, q, z) by quantifying over all locally polynomial-bounded
adversaries A and environments Z (in the sense of [9]). Note that all our pro-
tocols will only satisfy properties with a small probability of error in κ as well
as in a parameter k that is selected from {1, . . . , κ}. (Note that, in practice, one
may choose k to be much smaller than κ, e.g., k = 6.)
2.1 Blockchain notation
Next, we introduce some basic blockchain notation, following [21]. A block is any
triple of the form B = 〈s, x, ctr〉 where s ∈ {0, 1}κ, x ∈ {0, 1}∗, ctr ∈ N are such
that satisfy predicate validblockDq (B) deﬁned as
(H(ctr,G(s, x)) < D) ∧ (ctr ≤ q),
where H,G are cryptographic hash functions (e.g., SHA-256) modelled as ran-
dom oracles. The parameter D ∈ N is also called the block's diﬃculty level. The
parameter q ∈ N is a bound that in the Bitcoin implementation determines the
size of the register ctr; in our treatment we allow this to be arbitrary, and use it
to denote the maximum allowed number of hash queries in a round. We do this
for convenience and our analysis applies in a straightforward manner to the case
that ctr is restricted to the range 0 ≤ ctr < 232 and q is independent of ctr.
A blockchain, or simply a chain is a sequence of blocks. The rightmost block
is the head of the chain, denoted head(C). Note that the empty string ε is also a
chain; by convention we set head(ε) = ε. A chain C with head(C) = 〈s′, x′, ctr′〉
can be extended to a longer chain by appending a valid block B = 〈s, x, ctr〉
that satisﬁes s = H(ctr′, G(s′, x′)). In case C = ε, by convention any valid block
of the form 〈s, x, ctr〉 may extend it. In either case we have an extended chain
Cnew = CB that satisﬁes head(Cnew) = B. Consider a chain C of lengthm and any
nonnegative integer k. We denote by Cdk the chain resulting from the pruning
of the k rightmost blocks. Note that for k ≥ len(C), Cdk = ε. If C1 is a preﬁx of
C2 we write C1  C2.
2.2 Basic security properties of the blockchain
We are going to show that the blockchain data structure built by our protocol
satisﬁes a number of basic properties, as formulated in [21,27]. At a high level,
the ﬁrst property, called common preﬁx, has to do with the existence, as well as
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persistence in time, of a common preﬁx of blocks among the chains of honest
players [21]. Here we will consider a stronger variant of the property, presented
in [27,34], which allows for the black-box proof of application-level properties
(such as the persistence of transactions entered in a public transaction ledger
built on top of the Bitcoin backbonecf. Section 4).
Deﬁnition 1 ((Strong) Common Preﬁx Property). The strong common
preﬁx property Qcp with parameter k ∈ N states that the chains C1, C2 reported by
two, not necessarily distinct honest parties P1, P2, at rounds r1, r2, with r1 ≤ r2,
satisfy Cdk1  C2.
The next property relates to the proportion of honest blocks in any portion
of some honest player's chain.
Deﬁnition 2 (Chain Quality Property). The chain quality property Qcq
with parameters µ ∈ R and k, k0 ∈ N states that for any honest party P with
chain C in viewΠ,A,Z(κ, z), it holds that for any k consecutive blocks of C, ex-
cluding the ﬁrst k0 blocks, the ratio of adversarial blocks is at most µ.
Further, in the derivations in [21] an important lemma was established re-
lating to the rate at which the chains of honest players were increasing as the
Bitcoin backbone protocol was run. This was explicitly considered in [27] as
a property under the name chain growth. Similarly to the variant of the com-
mon preﬁx property above, this property along with chain quality were shown
suﬃcient for the black-box proof of application-level properties (in this case,
transaction ledger liveness; see Section 4).
Deﬁnition 3 (Chain Growth Property). The chain growth property Qcg
with parameters τ ∈ R (the chain speed coeﬃcient) and s, r0 ∈ N states that
for any round r > r0, where honest party P has chain C1 at round r and chain
C2 at round r + s in viewΠ,A,Z(κ, z), it holds that |C2| − |C1| ≥ τ · s.
3 The Bootstrapped Backbone Protocol
We begin this section by presenting the bootstrapped Bitcoin backbone proto-
col, followed by its security analysis. In a nutshell, the protocol is a generalization
of the protocol in [21], which is enhanced in two ways: (1) an initial challenge-
exchange phase, in which parties contribute random values, towards the estab-
lishment of an unpredictable genesis block, despite the precomputation eﬀorts of
corrupt players, and (2) a ranking process and chain-validation predicate that, in
addition to its basic function (checking the validity of a chain's content), enables
the identiﬁcation of fresh candidate genesis blocks. The ranking process yields
a graded list of genesis blocks and is inpired by the key ranking protocol in
[1], where it is used to produce a graded PKI, as mentioned in Section 1.
Before describing the bootstrapped backbone protocol in detail, we highlight
its unique features.
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No trusted setup and individual genesis block mining. Parties start without
any prior coordination and enter an initial challenge-exchange phase, where
they will exchange random values that will be used to construct freshness
proofs for candidate genesis blocks. The parties will run the initial challenge-
exchange phase for a small number of rounds, and subsequently will try
to mine their own genesis blocks individually. Once they mine or accept a
genesis block from the network they will engage in mining further blocks
and exchanging blockchains as in Bitcoin's blockchain protocol. On occasion
they might switch to a chain with a diﬀerent genesis block. Nevertheless, as
we will show, quite soon they will stabilize in a common preﬁx and a single
genesis block.
Freshness of genesis block impacts chains' total weight. Chains rooted at a
genesis block will incorporate its weight in their total valuation. Genesis
blocks can be quite heavy compared to regular blocks and their total val-
uation will depend on how fresh they are. Their weight in general might
be as much as a linear number of regular blocks in the security parameter.
Furthermore, each regular block in a chain accounts for 3 units in terms of
the total weight of the chain, something that, as we show, will be crucial
to account for diﬀerences in terms of weight that are assigned to the same
genesis block by diﬀerent parties running the protocol (cf. Remark 1).
Personalized chain selection rule. Given the co-existence of multiple genesis
blocks, a ranking process is incorporated into the chain selection rule that, in
addition to its basic function (checking the validity of a chain's content) and
picking the longest chain, it now also takes into account the freshness degree
of a genesis block from the perspective of each player running the protocol.
The ranking process eﬀectively yields a graded list of genesis blocks and is
inspired by the key ranking protocol in [1], where it is used to produce
a graded PKI (see further discussion below). The weight value for each
genesis block will be thus proportional to its perceived freshness by each
party running the protocol (the fresher the block the higher its weight). It
follows that honest players use diﬀerent chain selection procedures since each
predicate is keyed with the random coins that were contributed by each
player in the challenge-exchange phase (and thus guaranteed to be fresh from
the player's perspective). This has the side eﬀect that the same genesis block
might be weighed diﬀerently by diﬀerent parties. Despite these diﬀerences,
we show that eventually all parties accept the same chains as valid and hence
will unify their chain selection rule in the course of the protocol.
Robustness is achieved after an initial period of protocol stabilization. All our
modiﬁcations integrate seamlessly with the Bitcoin backbone protocol [21],
and we are able to show that our blockchain protocol is a robust transaction
ledger, in the sense of satisfying the properties of persistence and liveness.
Nevertheless, contrary to [21], the properties are satisﬁed only after an initial
period of rounds where persistence is uncertain and liveness might be slower;
this is the period where the parties still stabilize the genesis block and they
might be more susceptible to attacks. Despite this, a ledger built on top of
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our blockchain will be available immediately after the challenges exchange
phase. Furthermore, once the stabilization period is over the robust trans-
action ledger behavior is guaranteed with overwhelming probability (in the
length of the security parameter).
3.1 Protocol Description
The bootstrapped Bitcoin backbone protocol is executed by an arbitrary number
of parties over an unauthenticated network (cf. Section 2). For concreteness, we
assume that the number of parties running the protocol is n; however, parties
need not be aware of this number when they execute the protocol. Communica-
tion over the network is achieved by utilizing a send-to-all Diffuse functionality
that is available to all parties (and may be abused by the adversary in the sense
of delivering diﬀerent messages to diﬀerent parties). After an initial (challenge)
phase, each party is to maintain a data structure called a blockchain, as deﬁned
above. Each party's chain may be diﬀerent, but, as we will prove, under certain
well-deﬁned conditions, the chains of honest parties will share a large common
preﬁx.
The protocol description intentionally avoids specifying the type of values
that parties try to insert in the chain, the type of chain validation they perform
(beyond checking for its structural properties with respect to the hash functions
G(·), H(·)), and the way they interpret the chain. In the protocol description,
these actions are abstracted by the external functions V (·), I(·), R(·) which are
speciﬁed by the application that runs on top of the backbone protocol.
The protocol is speciﬁed as Algorithm 1. At a high level, the protocol ﬁrst
executes a challenge-exchange phase for l+1 rounds (l will be determined later),
followed by the basic backbone functions, i.e., mining and broadcasting blocks;
a crucial diﬀerence here with respect to the original backbone protocol is that
the chain validation process must also verify candidate genesis blocks, which in
turn requires updating the validation function as the protocol proceeds. (This,
however, only happens in the next l rounds after the challenge phase.) The
protocol's supporting algorithms are speciﬁed next.
The challenge-exchange phase. In order to generate an unpredictable genesis
block, players ﬁrst execute a challenge-exchange phase, where they broadcast,
for a given number of rounds (l + 1), randomly generated challenges that de-
pend on the challenges received in the previous rounds. The property that is
assured is that an honest player's k-round challenge, 1 ≤ k ≤ l, depends on the
(k − 1)-round challenges of all honest players. This dependence is made explicit
through the random oracle. The code of the challenge-exchange phase is shown
in Algorithm 2.
Validation predicate update. In the original backbone protocol [21], the
chain validation function (called validatesee below) performs a validation of
the structural properties of a given chain C, and remains unchanged throughout
the protocol. In our case, however, where there is no initial fresh common random
string, the function plays the additional role of checking for valid genesis blocks,
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Algorithm 1 The bootstrapped backbone protocol, parameterized by the input
contribution function I(·), the chain reading function R(·), and parameter l.
1: C ← ε
2: st← ε
3: round← 1 . Global variable round
4: Gen← ∅ . Set of candidate genesis blocks
5: Rank ← 〈〉
6: (c,A, c)← exchangeChallenges(1κ)
7: while True do
8: k ← round− l − 2
9: MGen ← {(〈s′, x′, ctr′〉, 〈A′l+1, . . . , A′l+1−k〉)} from Receive()
10: MChain ← chains C′ found in Receive()
11: (Gen,Rank)← updateValidate(c,A,MGen, Gen,Rank)
12: C˜ ← maxvalid(C,MChain, Gen,Rank)
13: 〈st, x〉 ← I(st, C˜, round, Input(),Receive())
14: Cnew ← pow(x, C˜, c)
15: if C 6= Cnew then
16: if C =  then . New genesis block has been produced
17: Diffuse( (Cnew, 〈Al+1, . . . , Al+1−(k+1)〉) )
18: C ← Cnew
19: Diffuse(C)
20: round← round+ 1
21: if Input() contains Read then
22: write R(xC) to Output()
and players have to update their validation predicate as the protocol advances
(for the ﬁrst l rounds after the challenge phase).
Indeed, using the challenges distributed in the challenge-exchange phase of
the protocol, players are able to identify fresh candidate genesis blocks that have
been shared during that phase and are accompanied by a valid proof. In addition,
the valid genesis blocks are ranked with a negative dependence on the round they
were received. In order to help other players to also identify the same genesis
blocks, players broadcast the valid genesis blocks they have accepted together
with the additional information needed by the other players for veriﬁcation. The
validation predicate update function is shown in Algorithm 3. Recall that Gen
is the set of candidate genesis blocks.
Chain validation. A chain is considered valid if in addition to the checks
performed by the basic backbone protocol regarding the chain's structural prop-
erties, its genesis block is in the Gen list, which is updated by the updateValidate
function (Algorithm 3). The chain validation function is shown in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 2 The challenge-exchange function. Note that variable round is
global, and originally set to 1.
1: function exchangeChallenges(1κ)
2: c1
R← {0, 1}κ
3: Diffuse(c1)
4: round← round+ 1
5: while round ≤ l + 1 do
6: Around ← κ-bit messages found in Receive()
7: rround
R← {0, 1}κ
8: Around ← Around||rround
9: cround ← H(Around) . Compute challenge
10: Diffuse(cround)
11: round← round+ 1
12: return (〈c1, . . . cl〉, 〈A2, . . . Al+1〉, cl+1)
Algorithm 3 The validation predicate update function.
1: function updateValidate(c,A,MGen, Gen,Rank)
2: k ← round− l − 2
3: if k ≥ l then
4: return Gen,Rank . No updates after round 2l + 2
5: for each (〈s′, x′, ctr′〉, 〈A′l+1, . . . , A′l+1−k〉) in MGen do
6: if validblockDq (〈s, x, ctr〉) ∧ 〈s, x, ctr〉 6∈ Gen then
7: flag ← (H(A′l+1) = s) ∧ (cl−k ∈ A′l+1−k)
8: for i = l + 1− k to l do
9: if H(A′i) 6∈ A′i+1 then
10: flag ← False
11: if flag = True then
12: Gen← Gen ∪ 〈s, x, ctr〉
13: Rank[〈s, x, ctr〉]← l − k
14: Diffuse(〈s, x, ctr〉, 〈A′l+1, . . . , A′l+1−k, Al−k〉) . Augment A′
sequence with own A value.
15: return Gen,Rank
Chain selection. The objective of the next algorithm in Algorithm 1, called
maxvalid, is to ﬁnd the best possible chain. The accepted genesis blocks have
diﬀerent weights depending on when a player received them. It is possible that
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the same genesis block is received by honest players in two diﬀerent rounds (as
we show later, those rounds have to be consecutive). In order to take into account
the slack introduced by the diﬀerent views honest players may have regarding
the same block, as well as the diﬀerent weights diﬀerent blocks may have, we let
the weight of a chain C be equal to the weight of its genesis block plus three times
its length minus one. The chain selection function is shown in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 4 The chain validation predicate, parameterized by q,D, the hash
functions G(·), H(·), and the content validation predicate V (·). The input is C.
1: function validate(C, Gen)
2: b← V (xC) ∧ (C 6= ε) ∧ (tail(C) ∈ Gen)
3: if b = True then
4: 〈s, x, ctr〉 ← head(C)
5: s′ ← H(ctr,G(s, x))
6: repeat
7: 〈s, x, ctr〉 ← head(C)
8: if validblockDq (〈s, x, ctr〉) ∧ (H(ctr,G(s, x)) = s′) then
9: (s′, C)← (s, Cd1) . Retain hash value and remove the head from C
10: else
11: b← False
12: until (C = ε) ∨ (b = False)
13: return b
Algorithm 5 The function that ﬁnds the best chain. The input is a set of
chains and the list of genesis blocks.
1: function maxvalid(C1, . . . , Ck, Gen)
2: temp← ε
3: maxweight← 0
4: for i = 1 to k do
5: if validate(Ci, Gen) then
6: weight← Rank(tail(Ci)) + 3(|Ci| − 1)
7: if maxweight < weight then
8: maxweight← weight
9: temp← Ci
10: return temp
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The proof-of-work function. Finally, we need to modify the proof-of-work
function in [21], so that when a genesis block is mined, the challenge computed in
the last round of the challenge-exchange phase will be included in the block. This,
in addition to the proof of genesis information sent in the backbone protocol,
is required so that other honest players accept this block as valid and rank it
accordingly. The code is presented in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 The proof of work function, parameterized by q, D and hash
functions H(·), G(·). The input is (x, C, c).
1: function pow(x, C, c)
2: if C = ε then
3: s← c . c is required to prove freshness
4: else
5: 〈s′, x′, ctr′〉 ← head(C)
6: s← H(ctr′, G(s′, x′))
7: ctr ← 1
8: B ← ε
9: h← G(s, x)
10: while (ctr ≤ q) do
11: if (H(ctr, h) < D) then . Proof of work found
12: B ← 〈s, x, ctr〉
13: break
14: ctr ← ctr + 1
15: return CB . Extend chain
Figure 2 presents the overall structure (phases and corresponding rounds) of
the bootstrapped backbone protocol. Next, we turn to its analysis.
Remark 1. To understand some of our design choices we brieﬂy give some ex-
amples of simpler protocols that don't work. For the ﬁrst example, assume that
we only have one round of challenge exchange i.e. l equal to 1. With some non-
negligible probability, the adversary can send one block to half of the honest
players and another block to the other half. By splitting the honest players in
two groups such that no one in the ﬁrst group will choose the chain of the second
and vice versa, agreement becomes impossible. Moreover, l must be large enough
so that at least one honest party computes a genesis block with overwhelming
probability. Otherwise the adversary can choose to remain silent and no genesis
block will be mined with non-negligible probability.
For the second example assume that blocks weigh less than 3 units, as in the
original protocol. Also, assume that somehow the problem of the ﬁrst example
was avoided and honest parties only adopted chains with genesis blocks that
everyone had in their genesis block list. In this case, uniquely successful rounds
would not imply agreement on a single chain (see Figure 3), as the adversary
would have been able to take advantage of the diﬀerent views that honest players
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Fig. 2. The diﬀerent phases of the bootstrapped backbone protocol.
have regarding the weight of genesis blocks. However, if we set the block weight
to 3, this event becomes impossible and makes the analysis a lot easier.
G1
G2
G1
G2
P1 P2
G1 6 5
G2 4 5
C1 10 9
C2 8 9
C ′2 10 11
C1
C2
C1
C ′2 +2
Fig. 3.An example where blocks weigh 2 units. In the table the weights of the respective
chains are depicted. Initially player P1 has adopted chain C1 and player P2 chain C2.
Then a uniquely successful round happens and C2 is extended to C′2. Notice that, P1
will not adopt C′2 since it has the same weight as C1. If the new block weighted 3 units,
all players would have adopted chain C′2.
3.2 Analysis of the Bootstrapped Backbone Protocol
First, some additional deﬁnitions that will become handy in the analysis. We saw
in the previous section that genesis blocks are assigned weights, and, further, that
a single genesis block may have diﬀerent weights for diﬀerent parties depending
on when they received it. We extend this notion to chains of blocks.
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Deﬁnition 4. Let wP (B) be the weight that P assigned to genesis block B. We
deﬁne the weight of a chain C with genesis block B (with respect to party P )to
be:
wP (C) = wP (B) + 3(|C| − 1).
If block B was not received by P until round 2l+1, or if C = , then wP (C) = −1.
In [21], all parties assign the same weight to the same chain, i.e., the length of
the chain; thus, for all parties Pi, Pj we have that wPi(C) = wPj (C). In contrast,
in our case the genesis block of each chain may have diﬀerent weight for diﬀerent
parties, akin to some bounded amount of noise that is party-dependent being
added to the chain weights. We are going to show that if the amount of noise
is at most 1, then by letting each new block weigh 3 units our protocol satisﬁes
the chain growth, common preﬁx and chain quality properties.
Deﬁnition 5. Regarding chains and their weight:
Deﬁne hC = maxP {wP (C)} and `C = minP {wP (C)}.
Let C(B) denote the truncation of chain C after its block B.
For a block B of a chain C, deﬁne hC(B) = hC(B) and similarly for `C(B).
(Sometimes we will abuse notation and write `(B) instead of `C(B). As long
as no collision happens `(B) is well deﬁned. The same holds for h(B).)
For chains C1 and C2, deﬁne C1∩C2 to be the chain formed by their common
preﬁx.
The following are important concepts introduced in [21], which we are also
going to use in our analysis:
Deﬁnition 6. A round is called:
successful if at least one honest party computes a solution;
uniquely successful if exactly one honest party computes a solution.
Deﬁnition 7. In an execution blocks are called:
honest, if mined by an honest party,
adversarial, if mined by the adversary, and
u.s. blocks, if mined in a uniquely successful round by an honest player.
Recall that our model is ﬂat in terms of computational power in the sense
that all honest parties are assumed to have the same computational power while
the adversary has computational power proportional to the number of players
that it controls. The total number of parties is n and the adversary is assumed
to control up to t of them (honest parties do not know any of these parameters).
Obtaining a new block is achieved by ﬁnding a hash value that is smaller than the
diﬃculty parameter D. Thus, the success probability that a single hash query
produces a solution is p = D2κ , where κ is the length of the hash. The total
hashing power of the honest players is α = pq(n − t), the hashing power of the
adversary is β = pqt, and the total hashing power is f = α + β. Moreover, in
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[21], a lower bound on the probability that a round is uniquely successful was
established; denoted by γ and equal to α−α2. Notice that γ is also a bound for
the probability of a round being just successful.
For each round j, we deﬁne the Boolean random variables Xj and Yj as
follows. Let Xj = 1 iﬀ j was a successful round, i.e., at least one honest party
computed a POW at round j, and let Yj = 1 iﬀ j was a uniquely successful
round, i.e., exactly one honest party computed a POW at round j. With respect
to a set of rounds S, let Z(S) denote the number of POWs obtained by the ad-
versary during the rounds in S (i.e., in qt|S| queries). Also, let X(S) =∑j∈S Xj
and deﬁne Y (S) similarly. Note that γ|S| ≤ E[Y (S)] ≤ E[X(S)] ≤ α|S| and
E[Z(S)] = β|S|.
Lemma 1. If |S| = k and γ ≥ (1 + δ)β for some δ ∈ (0, 1), then
Pr[Y (S) > (1 +
5δ
9
)Z(S)] > 1− e−Ω(δ2k).
Proof. By the Chernoﬀ bound we have that:
Pr[Y (S) ≤ (1− δ
8
)E[Y (S)]] ≤ e− δ
2γk
128 and Pr[Z(S) ≥ (1− δ
9
)E[Z(S)] ≤ e− δ
2βk
243 .
Suppose none of the above events happens. Then, from the union bound, we get
that with probability 1− e−(2 min( β243 , γ128 )δ2k−ln(2)) it holds that
Y (S) > (1− δ
8
)γk ≥ (1− δ
8
)(1 + δ)βk ≥ (1 + 5δ
9
)(1 +
δ
9
)βk > (1 +
5δ
9
)Z(S).
Remark 2. For ease of exposition, in our analysis we will assume that there are
no collisions; that is, for any two diﬀerent queries to the random oracle, always
a diﬀerent response is returned. This would generally be a problem since for
example it would break independence of Xi, Xj , for i 6= j, and we would not
be able to apply the Chernoﬀ bound in the previous lemma. However, since the
probability of a collision happening, as well as all other events we consider, is
at most e−Ω(κ), we can always use the union bound to include the event of no
collision occurring to our other assumptions. In addition, we assume that no two
queries to the oracle are the same, as formalized by the Input Entropy condition
in [21].
Properties of the genesis block generation process. We now establish a
number of properties of the genesis block generation process.
Lemma 2 (Graded Consistency). If any honest party Pi accepts genesis
block B with rank wPi(B) > 1, then all honest parties accept B with rank at
least wPi(B)− 1.
Proof. Let wPi(B) = k > 1. Since Pi accepted B with rank k at some round r,
he must have received a message of the form (B,El+1, .., Ek+1), where
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B is a valid block that contains H(El+1);
Ek+1 contains ck and for k + 2 < j ≤ l + 1, Ej contains H(Ej−1); and
ck is the challenge computed by Pi at round k.
Since k > 0, according to Algorithm 3, Pi is going to broadcast (B,El+1, .., Ek+1, Ak),
where H(Ak) = ck is contained in Ek+1 and Ak contains all the messages re-
ceived by Pi at round k. All honest-party challenges of round k−1 were received
in this round; therefore, all honest parties have accepted or will accept block B
by the next round and the lemma follows.
Lemma 3 (Validity). Genesis blocks computed by honest parties before round
2l + 2, will be accepted by all honest parties in the next round.
Proof. Suppose honest party Pi mined genesis block B at round m. According to
Algorithm 1, B contains the challenge he has computed at the last round of the
challenge-exchange phase. In addition, when the party broadcasts it, it includes
the message sets Al+1, . . . , Ar, where Aj contains the messages received by Pi
at round j and r = 2l + 2−m. Since Pi is honest, the following hold:
B is a valid block that contains H(Al+1);
for r + 1 < j ≤ l + 1, Aj contains H(Aj−1);
if cr is the challenge sent by some honest party at round r, then cr is con-
tained in Ar+1; and
all honest parties are going to receive the message.
Thus, all honest parties are going to accept B at round m + 1 and the lemma
follows.
Lemma 4 (Freshness). Let r ≤ l + 2. Every block computed before round r
cannot be part of some chain with genesis block B, where wP (B) ≥ r − 1 for
some honest party P , with overwhelming probability in the security parameter κ.
Weak chain growth. We now turn our attention to the weight of chains and
prove a weak chain-growth property. In the original Bitcoin backbone proto-
col [21], it was proved that chains grow at least at the rate of successful rounds,
independently of the adversary's behavior. Here, at least initially, the chains of
honest parties grow in a weak manner, in the sense that the adversary is able
to slow down this growth by using his own blocks. Later on, we will show that
after some speciﬁc round our protocol also achieves optimal chain growth.
Lemma 5. Let round r such that l+ 2 ≤ r < 2l+ 2, and suppose that at round
r an honest party, say, P1 has a chain C such that wP1(C) = d. Then, by round
s, where r ≤ s < 2l + 2, every honest party P will have received a chain C′ of
weight at least wP (C′) = d− 2 + 3
∑s−1
i=r Yi −
∑s−1
i=r Zi.
Proof. (Sketch) Note that every time a uniquely successful round happens, the
minimum weight over all parties' chains will increase by 2. Moreover, if the
adversary has not diﬀused any block in the same round the minimum weight
increases by 3. By applying this result iteratively, the lemma follows. We refer
the reader to the full version of the paper for the full proof.
19
Universal chain validity. A novelty of our construction is that the same genesis
block may have diﬀerent weight for diﬀerent parties. Unfortunately, it could be
the case that due to the adversary's inﬂuence, a genesis block is valid for one
party but invalid for another. This could lead to disagreement, in the sense that
some honest parties may adopt a chain that others don't because it is not valid
for them. We will show that with overwhelming probability such an event cannot
occur for our protocol; as such, chain validity is a universal property; if some
honest party accepts a chain C as valid, then C will also be valid for all other
parties.
Notice, that in order to prove the following lemma we need l to be greater
than a value that depends on 1/γ, i.e. the expected time it takes for honest parties
to mine a block, and the security parameter κ (see also Remark 1). Intuitively
l should be large enough so that (i) honest parties mine at least one block at
this time interval, and (ii) any adversarial chain that is based on a genesis block
broadcast at the end of the bootstraping phase will never be adopted by honest
parties (because such genesis block will have too small weight in comparison).
Lemma 6. Suppose that for some δ ∈ (0, 1), 3(1 + δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , and
γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, and that at round r an honest party P has chain C. Then C will
also be valid for all other parties from this round on with probability 1−e−Ω(δ2k).
The complete version of the weak chain growth lemma follows from the ar-
gument we've made above.
Corollary 1. Suppose that for some δ ∈ (0, 1), 3(1 + δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f ,
and γ ≥ (1 + δ)β. Let round r such that r ≥ l + 2, and suppose that at round r
an honest party, say, P1 has a chain C such that wP1(C) = d. Then, by round s,
where r ≤ s, every honest party P will have received a chain C′ of weight at least
wP (C′) = d− 2 + 3
∑s−1
i=r Yi −
∑s−1
i=r Zi with probability at most 1− e−Ω(δ
2k).
Remark 3. Note further that the dependency of γ on n does not undermine the
scalability of the round complexity of our protocol. This claim is argued on the
basis that the diﬃculty level D can be set proportional to 1/n, so that γ can be
treated as a constant and then l is in essence independent of n (note that both
parameters would be polynomials in κ).
A bound on adversarially precomputed blocks. The honest parties begin
mining right after the challenge-exchange phase. Note that it does not help the
adversary to precompute blocks before the challenge-exchange phase, except for
the small probability of the event that some of his blocks happen to extend future
blocks. We have shown that the adversary cannot create a private chain that
honest parties will adopt if he starts mining at the ﬁrst round of the challenge-
exchange phase. It is though possible to start mining after the ﬁrst round in order
to gain some advantage over the honest parties. The following lemma provides a
bound on the number of blocks mined during the challenge-exchange phase with
suﬃcient weight so that they can be later used by the adversary.
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Lemma 7 (Precomputed blocks). Assume 3(1+δ)f < 1 and l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f ,
for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Let R be the set that contains any adversarial block B mined
before round l + 2, where h(B) > l − 1 − (1 − δ)δ2k. Then Pr[|R| > 5δ9 kβ] ≤
e−Ω(δ
4k).
Proof. (Sketch) We ﬁrst show that the adversary cannot take advantage of blocks
which belong to chains whose genesis block was computed early on in the chal-
lenge exchange phase. Hence, with overwhelming probability she can only use
blocks computed near the end of the challenge exchange phase; remember that
the weight of a genesis block is small if it is mined early in the challenge exchange
phase. By applying appropriate Chernoﬀ bounds the result follows. We refer the
reader to the full version of the paper for the full proof.
We are now ready to prove the security properties listed in Section 2.2.
Common Preﬁx. Every time a uniquely successful round happens all honest
players converge to one chain, unless the adversary broadcasts some new block.
This turns out to be a very important fact and a consequence of it is described
in the next lemma.
Lemma 8. Suppose block B in chain C is a u.s. block and consider a chain C′
such that B 6∈ C′. If `C′ ≥ `C(B)− 1 then there exists a unique adversarial block
B′ such that `C′(B′) ∈ [`C(B) − 1, `C(B) + 1]. Moreover, if B is not a genesis
block, then B′ will also not be a genesis block.
Proof. Assume block B was mined at some round r. If B is not a genesis block,
then for any honest block B′′ mined before round r it should hold that `(B′′) ≤
`(B)−2. Otherwise, at round r no honest party would choose the parent of B to
mine new blocks. If B is a genesis block, then no other honest party has mined
a block in some previous round. On the other hand, for any honest block B′′
mined after round r it must hold that `(B′′) ≥ `(B) − 1 + 3 = `(B) + 2, since
honest parties will only extend chains of length at least `(B)−1 after this round.
Thus, if a block with weight in the given interval exists, it must be adversarial.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose B is not a genesis block while B′ is
a genesis block and let B′′ be the parent of B. Then hC(B′′) < `C′(B′) since
hC(B′′) ≤ `C(B) − 2. This implies than every honest party received B′ before
block B′′. But then, no honest party would mine on the parent of B, because
he would have lower weight than B′, which leads to a contradiction. Hence, the
lemma follows.
We use Lemma 8 in order to show that the existence of a fork implies that the
adversary has mined blocks proportional in number to the time the fork started.
Theorem 1. Assume 3(1+δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1+δ)β, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1). Let S be the set of the chains of the honest parties from round 2l + 2
and onwards of the bootstrapped backbone protocol. Then the probability that S
does not satisfy the strong common-preﬁx property with parameter k is at most
e−Ω(δ
4k).
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Proof. (Sketch.) We are going to use Lemma 8 to match u.s. blocks to adversarial
ones. Function ` will help us show that the matched blocks are distinct; every
pair of matched blocks is very close with respect to the ` function, while pairs
of u.s. blocks can be very far under speciﬁc conditions. Initially, we construct
such a matching whenever we have a fork between two chains C1, C2, either by
matching adversarial blocks alternatively to each of the chains or by matching
consecutive u.s. blocks on the same chain to consecutive adversarial blocks in
the other chain.
Using this result, we prove that if a deep enough fork exists, the adver-
sary must have mined more blocks than his hashing power allows, which leads
to a contradiction. In more detail, the initial fork implies the existence of some
honestly mined block B that is part of the common preﬁx of the two chains.
Starting from B we construct a matching of all u.s. blocks mined after it, by
picking deeper and deeper forks and repeatedly applying the matching pro-
cedure. Using the upper bound on precomputed blocks established in Lemma 7,
we can show that the adversary is able to mine a suﬃcient number of blocks
only with negligible probability. Hence, the theorem follows.
Chain Growth. We proved that after round 2l + 1 the strong common-preﬁx
property is satisﬁed. This implies that all players share a common genesis block
after this round. The next lemma shows that this is suﬃcient in order to get
chain growth at the same level as in the original Backbone protocol.
Lemma 9. Suppose that at round r an honest party P1 has a chain C of weight
wP1(C) = d and all honest parties after round r − 1 adopt chains that share the
same genesis block B. Then, by round s ≥ r, every honest party P will have
received a chain C′ of weight at least wP (C′) = d− 1 + 3
∑s−1
i=r Xi.
Proof. Since all parties adopt chains with the same genesis block after round
r − 1, and P1 has adopted a chain C of weight d, there are two cases: either
(1) `C = d− 1 and any chain that honest parties adopt after round r − 1 has a
weight that is congruent to d or d − 1 modulo 3, or (2) `C = d and the weight
is congruent to d or d + 1 modulo 3. This observation is implied from the fact
that each extra block adds 3 units of weight to the chain and B can only have
two diﬀerent weights under the views of honest parties.
It is suﬃcient to study only one of the two cases so w.l.o.g. suppose that
the weight of the chains is congruent to d or d − 1 modulo 3. The proof is by
induction on s− r ≥ 0. For the basis (s = r), observe that if at round r P1 has a
chain C of weight wP1(C) = d, then he broadcast C at an earlier round (than r).
It follows that every honest party P will receive C by round r and wP (C) ≥ d−1.
For the inductive step, note that by the inductive hypothesis every honest
party P has received a chain C′ of weight at least wP (C′) = d′ = d−1+3
∑s−2
i=r Xi
by round s − 1. When Xs−1 = 0 the statement follows directly, so assume
Xs−1 = 1. Observe that every honest party queried the oracle with a chain of
weight at least d′ at round s− 1. It follows that every honest party P successful
at round s− 1 broadcast a chain C′ of weight at least wP (C′) = d′+ 3. For every
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other party P ′ it holds that wP ′(C′) ≥ d′+ 2 ≥ d− 1 + 3
∑s−1
i=r Xi− 1. However,
no chain that an honest party adopts can have length d′ + 2, because d′ + 2 is
congruent to d − 2 modulo 3. Thus all honest parties adopt chains that have
length at least d′ + 3 and the lemma follows.
It can be easily shown that Lemma 9 implies the chain growth property after
round 2l + 1.
Theorem 2. Assume 3(1+δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1+δ)β, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1). The bootstrapped Bitcoin protocol satisﬁes the chain growth property
for r0 = 2l+2 with speed coeﬃcient (1−δ)γ and probability at least 1−e−Ω(δ4s).
Chain Quality. We ﬁrst observe a consequence of Theorem 1.
Lemma 10. Assume 3(1 + δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1). From round 2l+ 2 and onwards of the bootstrapped backbone protocol,
the probability that the adversary has a chain which is more than k blocks longer
than the chain of some honest party is at most e−Ω(δ
4k).
Proof. Given any execution and an adversary that at a round r has a chain C
which is k blocks longer than the chain C′ of an honest party P , we can deﬁne
an adversary such that at round r+1 the common-preﬁx property does not hold
for parameter k. The adversary simply sends C to P ′ 6= P at round r.
Theorem 3. Assume 3(1+δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1+δ)β, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Suppose C belongs to an honest party and consider any k consecutive
blocks of C computed after round 2l+2 of the bootstrapped backbone protocol. The
probability that the adversary has contributed more than (1 + δ2 )
β
γ · k ≤ (1− δ3 )k
of these blocks is less than e−Ω(δ
5k).
Corollary 2. Assume 3(1+δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1+δ)β, for some real
δ ∈ (0, 1/2). The bootstrapped Bitcoin protocol satisﬁes the chain-quality property
with parameters µ = (1 + δ2 )
β
γ , k0 = 2f(1 + δ)(l + 1), and k, with probability at
least 1− eΩ(δ5k).
Proof. Note that the next two events occur with probability at least 1− eΩ(δ2l),
for any δ ∈ (0, 1). The honest parties in the ﬁrst l + 1 rounds have computed
at most α(1 + δ)(l + 1) blocks. The adversary, who might have been mining
also during the challenges phase, has computed at most 2β(1 + δ)(l + 1). The
statement then follows from Theorem 3, since α(1+δ)(l+1)+2β(1+δ)(l+1) <
2f(1 + δ)(l + 1).
4 Applications of the Bootstrapped Backbone Protocol
In this section we present applications of our construction, starting with its pri-
mary/original one: a distributed ledger, i.e., a public and permanent summary
23
of all transactions that honest parties can agree on as well as add their own, de-
spite the potentially disruptive behavior of parties harnessing less than 1/2 of the
hashing power. This entails proving that the ledger's required security properties
(Persistence and Liveness  cf. [21]) hold in a genesis block-less setting.
Next, we consider the problem of setting up a PKI in our unauthenticated
network setting from scratch, i.e., without any trusted setup. As mentioned in
Section 1, the idea of using POWs as an identity-assignment tool was put forth
by Aspnes et al. [2]. Here we build on this idea as well as on the 2-for-1 POWs
technique from [21] to use our bootstrapped protocol to assign identities to
parties. The assignment relation will possibly assign more than one identities
to the same party, while guaranteeing that the majority of them is assigned to
honest parties.
Finally, applying the 2-for-1 POWs technique we can also solve the consensus
(aka Byzantine agreement) problem [36,31] without any trusted setup, even if
the adversary has almost the same hashing power as the honest parties, and in a
number of rounds independent of the number of parties. Indeed, all our protocols
have round complexity linear in the security parameter, and enjoy simultaneous
termination.
Compared to other works, most notably [1], our approach is diﬀerent in the
order in which it sets up a bulletin board and assigns identities to parties. We
choose to ﬁrst establish the formeri.e., the ledgerand then assign the iden-
tities; in contrast, in [1] identities are established ﬁrst in a graded manner, and
then using that infrastructure the parties can implement a broadcast channel.
We now turn to the applications in detail.
Robust public transaction ledger. A public transaction ledger is deﬁned with
respect to a set of valid ledgers L and a set of valid transactions T , each one
possessing an eﬃcient membership test. A ledger x ∈ L is a vector of sequences
of transactions tx ∈ T . Each transaction tx may be associated with one or more
accounts. Ledgers correspond to chains in the backbone protocol. In the proto-
col execution there also exists an oracle Txgen that generates valid transactions.
Note, that it is possible for the adversary to create two transactions that are con-
ﬂicting; valid ledgers must not contain conﬂicting transaction. We will assume
that the oracle is unambiguous, i.e., that the adversary cannot create transac-
tions that come in `conﬂict' with the transactions generated by the oracle. A
transaction is called neutral if there does not exist any transactions that comes
in conﬂict with it.
In order to turn the backbone protocol into a protocol realizing a public
transaction ledger suitable deﬁnitions were given for functions V (·), R(·), I(·)
in [21]. Namely, V (〈x1, . . . , xm) is true if its input is a valid ledger. Function
R(C) returns the contents of the chain if they constitute a valid ledger, otherwise
it is undeﬁned. Finally, I(st, C, round, INPUT(), RECEIVE()) returns the largest
subsequence of transactions in the input and receive tapes that constitute a valid
ledger, with respect to the contents of the chain the party already has, together
with a randomly generated neutral transaction. We denote the instantiation of
our protocol with these functions by ΠBootPL . For more details we refer to [21].
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Deﬁnition 8. A protocol Π implements a robust public transaction ledger in
the q-bounded synchronous setting without trusted setup if there is a round r0 so
that the following two properties are satisﬁed:
Persistence: Parameterized by k ∈ N (the depth parameter), if in a certain
round after r0 an honest player reports a ledger that contains a transaction
tx in a block more than k blocks away from the end of the ledger, then tx will
always be reported in the same position in the ledger by any honest player
from this round on.
Liveness: Parameterized by u, k ∈ N (the wait time and depth parame-
ters, resp.), provided that a transaction either (i) issued by Txgen, or (ii) is
neutral, is given as input to all honest players continuously for u consecutive
rounds after round r0, then there exists an honest party who will report this
transaction at a block more than k blocks from the end of the ledger.
Chain quality, chain growth and the strong common preﬁx property were
shown in [27] to be suﬃcient to implement such a ledger10 in a black-box manner.
Our protocol satisﬁes all these properties after a speciﬁc condition is met. Chain
quality holds after the 2f(1 + δ)(l + 1) block in the chain of any player, as
Corollary 2 dictates, and common preﬁx and chain growth hold after round
2l + 2, according to Theorem 1. Finally, due to chain growth, after at most
(2(1 + δ)(1 − δ)f/γ + 2)(l + 1) ≤ 14(l + 1) rounds all necessary conditions will
have been met with overwhelming probability.
Lemma 11 (Persistence). Assume 3(1+δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1+δ)β,
for some real δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Then for all k ∈ N protocol ΠBootPL satisﬁes Persistence
after round 2l+ 2 with probability 1− e−Ω(δ5k), where k is the depth parameter.
Lemma 12 (Liveness). Assume 3(1 + δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1 + δ)β,
for some real δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Further, assume oracle Txgen is unambiguous. Then
for all k ∈ N protocol ΠBootPL satisﬁes Liveness after round 14(l+1) with wait time
u = 3(1−δ)γ ·max(k, 11−(1+ δ2 ) βγ ) rounds and depth parameter k with probability at
least 1− e−Ω(δ5k).
Corollary 3. Assume 3(1 + δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some
real δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Then protocol ΠBootPL implements a robust transaction ledger with
parameter r0 = 14(l + 1).
Fast PKI setup. Next, we use the ledger to generate an honest majority PKI
from scratch in a number of rounds that is linear in the security parameter11. The
ﬁrst idea that we are going to use is that of a 2-for-1 POW described in [21]. At a
high level, the technique allows to do combined mining for two POW schemes in
the price of one. In more detail, we can add additional information in the queries
to the random oracle, and if the response to the query is less than some value
10 A similar deﬁnitional approach was pursued in [34].
11 For this subsection we assume that the adversary is static.
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T1, then we consider it a valid POW of type 1; if it is greater than some value
T2 we consider it as a valid POW of type 2. T1 and T2 should be appropriately
chosen so that the events of success in either of these POWs are independent.
The second POW is used to mine transactions, in the same way blocks are
mined. This guarantees that the number of transactions is proportional to the
hashing power of each player. By having parties broadcast their transactions on
one hand, and making sure that at least one honest block that contains these
transactions is in the chain of all honest parties due to liveness on the other hand,
the protocol in [21] manages to achieve consensus assuming an honest-majority
hashing power.
In our case, transactions will contain the public keys, and in this way we
will obtain an honest-majority PKI. However, in contrast with [21], we cannot
let parties start mining transactions from the beginning of the execution, since
the adversary would have some additional precomputation time. Instead, we
are going to wait for the public ledger to be established, and then use some
of the blocks added by honest parties to guarantee that all transactions where
mined recently enough. In more detail, any POW will be represented by a triple
〈w, ctr, label〉. The veriﬁcation procedure for block level POWs (block POWs
for short) will be of the form
H(ctr, 〈G(w), label〉) < T1,
while the veriﬁcation procedure for the transaction level POWs will be of the
form
[H(ctr, 〈label, G(w)〉)]R < T2,
where [a]R denotes the reverse of the bitstring a. In w we are going to encode
the information needed for each application. For example, in block POWs, w will
contain the transactions related to this block as well as the hash of the previous
block. Note that by making one hash query of the form H(ctr, 〈G(w0), G(w1)〉)
and only two comparisons, we will be mining POWs of both types at the same
time. Moreover, if dlog(T1)e + dlog(T2)e is less than κ, where κ is the size of
the hash's output, then the events of succeeding in any of the two POWs are
independent, since they depend on diﬀerent bits of the hash which are sampled
independently and uniformly at random by the random oracle.
Next, we describe our protocol ΠPKIPL for an honest party P . L1, L2 are con-
stants such that L1 < L2.
Initialization. P runs ΠBootPL , as described so far, until she receives a chain of
length at least L1. We choose L1 so that it is guaranteed that all security
properties hold, and about k new blocks have been inserted in the common-
preﬁx of the chains of all honest players.
2-for-1 mining. Let C be P 's chain at the end of the initialization phase.
From now on, she is going to do 2-for-1 POW mining, and include in her
transaction POWs (i) the hash of the (L1 − k)-th block of C, and (ii) a
randomly generated public key for which she has stored the corresponding
secret key. Obviously, a new key must be generated every time she starts
26
mining a new transaction. Whenever P mines a new transaction, she diﬀuses
it to the network, and whenever she receives one, she includes it in the
transactions of the block she is mining.
The ﬁrst time P receives a chain of length greater or equal to L2, she
runs the Key extraction procedure (below). The phase ends at round L2(1−δ)γ ,
where P runs the Termination procedure.
Key extraction. P extracts and stores a set of keys from her current chain
according to the following rules: If chain C′ is her chain at this round, she
stores any public key which belongs to a transaction that (i) is in the ﬁrst
L2−k blocks of C′, and (ii) the hash of the block contained in the transaction
matches the hash of the (L1 − k)-th block in her chain.
Termination. P outputs the keys from the key extraction phase and termi-
nates.
Next, we prove that a consistent PKI with an honest majority is generated
at the end of the execution of protocol ΠPKIPL . Two properties are guaranteed: (1)
honest parties output the same set of keys and (2) more than half of these keys
have been generated by them. For the rest of this section let α2, β2, f2 be the
corresponding values of α, β, f for the diﬃculty level T2, e.g. f2 = nq
T2
2κ . The full
proof of the following theorem is provided in the full version of the paper.
Theorem 4. Assume 3(1 + δ)f < 1, l > (1−δ)k/γ+31−3(1+δ)f , γ ≥ (1 + δ)β, for some
real δ ∈ (0, 1/2) and dlog(T1)e + dlog(T2)e ≤ κ. Then, for parameters L1 =
14(l + 1)(1 + δ)f + 2k and L2 = L1 + 2k · (1 + 10δ ) (1+δ)f(1−δ)γ the following hold for
protocol ΠPKIPL with probability 1− e−Ω(δ
5k):
All honest players output the same set of public keys, the size of which is
k
α2
γ
20
δ
≤ N ≤ 60kf2
γ
(1 +
10
δ
);
the majority of the keys are generated by honest parties; and
ΠPKIPL has round complexity linear in κ.
Proof. (Sketch) First, note that the adversary can start precomputing trans-
actions at most 2k/γ rounds before the honest parties. Otherwise, she will be
unable to predict the hash of their chain as dictated by our protocol, since by
the chain quality property the chain of each honest player will contain an honest
block near the tail of the chain. Moreover, again by the chain quality and com-
mon preﬁx properties, the adversary will stop mining transactions at most 2k/γ
rounds after the honest parties. After this round, she will be unable to insert
her transactions deep enough in the chain for the honest parties to take them
into account. Finally, by choosing an appropriate value for δ, we are sure that
the number of keys mined by the honest parties is greater than the number of
keys mined by the adversary.
Remark 4. To better understand ΠPKIPL we compute diﬀerent parameters of the
system for the Bitcoin network parameters. Assume that f = 2%, α = 1.33%, γ =
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1.31%, β = 0.6%, k = 10, and δ = 0.25. The choice of f approximately corre-
sponds to a rate of one block per 10 minutes with a round duration of about
12 seconds; the adversary's hashing power is half of that of the honest parties.
Then, l ≈ 623, which corresponds in terms of rounds to about 2 hours. Moreover,
if we set f2 to be equal to f/k we have that 80 < N < 600. We note that the
parameters of Bitcoin are quite conservative and that's why our runtime suﬀers.
In principle, by carefully analyzing and re-engineering our protocol we can get
tighter bounds; many of the design decisions we got here, were made to aid the
readability of our work.
Remark 5. The probability that some honest party succeeds in mining at least
one transaction is:
Pr[≥ 1 key] = 1− Pr[0 keys] = 1− (1− T2
2κ
)q
20k
(1−δ)γδ ≥ 1− e−T22κ ·q 20k(1−δ)γδ .
Hence, by setting T2 >
ln( 1 )2
κ(1−δ)γδ
q·20k , each party will obtain at least one key
with probability at least 1− , for any  ∈ (0, 1). Note here that T2 and κ must
be carefully chosen to retain the independence of the 2 POWs. In case this is
not possible, the 2-for-1 mining phase may be extended.
Consensus and other applications. Next, we describe how ΠPKIPL can be used
in other contexts. First, a direct application of our protocol is in the context of
proof of stake protocols. In this type of protocols, blocks are mined by randomly
selecting stake holders with probability proportional to their stake. A typical
requirement for bootstrapping such protocols (e.g. [28,30]), is that in the initial
state of the economy the majority of the coins is controlled by honest parties. By
assigning one coin to each public key produced by our protocol, we can eﬃciently
and securely bootstrap a proof of stake protocol.
A more general application of ΠPKIPL is in solving consensus (aka Byzantine
agreement) [36,31], with no trusted setup, and in a number of rounds indepen-
dent of the number of parties. If parties submit transactions containing their
input instead of public keys, it follows that by taking the majority of their out-
put they are going to achieve Byzantine agreement. That is, everyone will agree
on the same value (the Agreement property), and if all honest parties have the
same input v, they are all going to output v (Validity).
Finally, our protocol for the establishment of an honest-majority PKI enables
the application of traditional Byzantine fault-tolerant techniques for ledger cre-
ation and maintenance based on subcommittees as opposed to mining (cf. [7])
to permissionless networks. Instead of having arbitrary membership authorities,
these committees can be elected using our protocol with the guarantee of an
honest majority. Note that by changing the diﬃculty of the transaction-level
POW we can force the number of parties in the committee to be in a speciﬁc
predeﬁned interval.
Reducing the communication cost. While the round complexity of our pro-
tocol is independent of the number of parties, this does not hold for its com-
munication cost, measured by the number of transmitted messages. The reason
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is that in the challenge-exchange phase, all parties have to diﬀuse their random
challenges, thus increasing the communication cost of the protocol by an O(n)
factor. We can redesign the challenge-exchange phase so that the number of dif-
ferent messages diﬀused by honest parties is independent of their number, and
only depends on the security parameter and the precomputation time available
to the adversary. 12 We do this in the following way: instead of having all parties
sent a random challenge in order to be sure that the genesis blocks that are later
mined are fresh, we demand that each random challenge be accompanied by a
POW. This way, all honest parties will be sure that at least one honest chal-
lenge is generated with high probability every O(κ) rounds. Moreover, honest
parties will only diﬀuse random challenges that are tied to a POW. Thus, the
total number of diﬀerent messages sent will be upper-bounded by the number
of POWs that the adversary and the honest parties combined have generated.
Also, again diﬀerent honest parties will have received the same block with at
most one round diﬀerence. By combining the above ideas, we can again create
a graded-agreement-type procedure for the genesis blocks and in the same way
achieve consensus. We defer further details to the full version of the paper.
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